Introduction
Secret sharing is an approach for protecting data. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Blakley 1 and Shamir 2 were the first to propose the idea of a ͑t , n͒ threshold sharing scheme. Polynomials were used to share a secret among n participants. Any t of the n participants ͑t ഛ n͒ could reconstruct the secret, but t − 1 participants could not. Thien and Lin 4 extended the work of Shamir by sharing a secret image and generated n shadows. The size of each shadow in their work is only 1 / t of that of the original secret image, and so the storage space and transmission time are kept low. To reduce the size of each shadow further, Tso 9 elegantly quantized the secret image and then shared it. Lin and Tsai 7 also transformed the secret image into the frequency domain and then shared the first discrete cosine transform ͑DCT͒ coefficient, which was used as a seed in a random number generator to yield a sequence of numbers that were then used to rearrange the values of the second to tenth DCT coefficients in each transformed block. In almost all sharing methods, since each generated shadow looks like noise, hiding methods [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] may be employed to hide each noise-like shadow in a cover image.
The missing-allowable feature makes image sharing methods useful to the distributed storage of a secret image. Specifically, the n shadows of an image can be stored in n places. Later, to reconstruct the image, the n shadows are grabbed over n distinct channels. Some of the n communication channels or the n storage disks may be out of service temporarily or deliberately if the owner of a shadow refuses to cooperate, but neither case will affect the reconstruction, as long as the number of missing shadows is not more than n − t. The potential problem of losing an image forever is thus erased using image sharing. Additionally, collecting fewer than t shadows yields nothing but noise, and this feature increases security.
Conventional image sharing methods reveal either the entire secret image ͑when any t of the n shadows are collected͒ or nothing ͑when fewer than t shadows are collected͒. This all-or-nothing property is useful when the image being shared is top secret. However, not all images in daily life are top secret. In many circumstances, the shared image might be sensitive in some way and yet not top secret. Restated, although an image must not be viewed by only a minority of the participants, the reconstruction of the image can still involve certain quality levels, such as low quality, middle quality, and high quality, based on whether the number of collected shadows reaches the corresponding thresholds. Such sharing is called progressive sharing: the sensitive image is reconstructed with improving quality, as determined by the number of the collected shadows in the decoding meeting.
Progressive sharing has a range of applications. Consider, for example, image searching in an antiterrorism intelligence office or a witness-protection program, when an authorized officer searches for a sensitive image from a missing-allowable database system with n distributed storage places. If the shadows of each image have been formed earlier by a traditional all-or-nothing sharing scheme, a user must wait for the entire image to be downloaded ͑by collecting t out of the n shadows͒ and then check whether the reconstructed image is useful. In contrast, using shadows in a progressive manner can reduce searching time: in the earlier stage of the reconstruction, people can obtain a rough version of the image by collecting a smaller number ͑t 1 ͒ of shadows ͑t 1 Ͻ t ഛ n͒; they can then abort further transmission as soon as the rough version indicates that the candidate image is absolutely not the sought image. Meanwhile, fewer than t 1 shadows reveal nothing but noise, providing a certain degree of protection of a sensitive image.
Another example involves the increasing use of mobile devices or computers to browse the web. Providing progressive versions of an image allows each authorized customer or team member to have more choices. Moreover, the number of downloadable shadows, which control the quality of the reconstructed versions, can be determined by the level of the paid membership ͑or authorized rank͒ of the downloader. In particular, if the image is too offensive or violent or allowed to be inspected only by a particular police team or intelligence squad, then controlling the number of shadows in a progressive manner can yield flexible design benefits or facilitate management of the system ͑as members of a single team but with different ranks are authorized to download different numbers of the n created shadows͒. An example of the third application has been presented elsewhere: 17 assume that the leader of a research team wants to prohibit any employee from selling highquality sensitive pictures or blueprints on the black market, but the leader still wants the employees to cooperate every day-for example, to improve a design in blueprints, preparations for surgery, or a body-guarding program, which may be directed at people shown in the images. The leader keeps some of the n generated shadows, and each of the employees has one of the remaining shadows. If the employees want to take a closer look, they have to ask the leader for permission. The leader can lend them one or more shadows to increase the clarity of the image. If an employee takes the shadows to an enemy, the remaining employees can still seek permission from the leader when they want to view the images with great clarity.
Recently, various progressive image sharing schemes have been proposed. [17] [18] [19] [20] However, in Fang's scheme, 18 the size of each shadow was expanded to four times larger than the input image. To avoid expansion, people may use approaches 17, 19, 20 that were based on the sharing scheme of Thien and Lin. 4 Chen and Lin 19 adopted a bit-plane scanning procedure to rearrange the input image pixels; the rearranged data were then shared. Wang and Shyu 20 elegantly decomposed the input image using spatial and depth information simultaneously and then shared the decomposed image. Hung et al. 17 shared the quantized DCT coefficients of the input image. Although the shadows in their work were much smaller than those in the preceding three works, [18] [19] [20] the reconstruction of their image was not lossless when all n shadows were collected.
This work offers a new design with all of the advantages of lossless reconstruction ͑when most of the shadows are collected͒, compact size, and progressive sharing. All n products ͑or n shadows͒ of the input image are compact and so can be hidden in stego media easily without excessively affecting the image quality of the cover media. These compact shadows are equally significant, meaning that the reconstructed version of the image depends only on the number of collected shadows. ͑Any of the shadows could be missing, so the sender or the receiver need not worry about which shadows are sent or collected first. This increases the probability of success of the decoding meeting.͒ The proposed scheme is easier than the progressive image sharing schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] to apply to scalable Moving Picture Experts Group ͑MPEG͒ video transmission, 21, 22 and the shadows herein can resist differential attack. [23] [24] [25] The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 presents the proposed scheme. Section 4 presents experimental results and makes comparisons with other methods. Section 5 discusses security. Last, Sec. 6 summarizes the contributions of this work.
Related Works

JPEG Joint Photographic Exports Group ͑JPEG͒
26 is an international image compression standard that is used commonly on the Internet. A given image is divided into several blocks of 8 ϫ 8 pixels each. The 8 ϫ 8 pixels of each block are transformed using DCT, and the transformed 8 ϫ 8 coefficients are quantized using a quantization table. The quantized 8 ϫ 8 coefficients are then scanned in zigzag order for entropy coding. After all of the blocks have been sequentially processed, the JPEG code is generated. A parameter called the quality factor QF ͑between 0 and 100͒ controls the quality of the JPEG decompressed image. A higher QF corresponds to higher quality of the JPEG decompressed image ͑and a larger created JPEG file͒.
Thien and Lin's Image Sharing Method
Thien and Lin 4 propose a ͑t , n͒ threshold method for splitting a grayscale secret image into n shadows. First, all of the gray values between 251 and 255 in the secret image must be truncated to 250 because the arithmetic operations in Eq. ͑1͒ are modulo 251. They then use a key to permute the pixels of the secret image; the permuted image is then partitioned into several sectors of t pixels each. For each not-yet-processed sector, define a polynomial:
where a 0 to a t−1 are the t pixel values. The n values f͑1͒, f͑2͒ ,..., and f͑n͒ are calculated and then attached to the n shadows. After all sectors have been processed, the n shadows are created. Since every t pixels in the secret image contribute a single pixel to each of the n generated shadows, each shadow size is 1 / t of the secret image size. In collecting at least t shadows, Thien and Lin take the first not-yet-used pixel from each of the t shadows and use these t pixel values f͑z 1 ͒, f͑z 2 ͒ ,..., and f͑z t ͒ to evaluate the t coefficients a 0 to a t−1 in Eq. ͑1͒ for the first sector by reconstructing the ͑t −1͒-deg polynomial f͑z͒ as
By processing all pixels of the obtained t shadows in order, they obtain the permuted image, which is then depermuted to reveal the secret image. 
Chen et al.'s JPEG Data Hiding Method
Chen et al. 27 propose a reversible JPEG steganography method for hiding secret data in a JPEG compression code. First, the JPEG compression code of the cover image is entropy decoded to obtain all quantized 8 ϫ 8 blocks ͕F͖ and an 8 ϫ 8 quantization When the original quantization table Q and the generated JPEG stego code are received, the secret can be completely extracted and the original JPEG code can also be reconstructed. First, the JPEG stego code is entropy decoded to obtain all stego quantized blocks ͕FЈ͖ and the 8 ϫ 8 modified quantization table QЈ. Next, based on the stego quantized coefficient FЈ͑i , j͒ of each block FЈ, the QЈ͑i , j͒-to-Q͑i , j͒ inverse scaling is employed to reconstruct the original quantized coefficient F͑i , j͒ using
where 0 ഛ i, j Ͻ 8. After the value of F͑i , j͒ is reconstructed, use Eq. ͑3͒ to compute M͑i , j͒, which is then used to extract the decimal equivalent of the hidden data Z͑i , j͒ as
An example of the embedding and extraction processes is as follows. Assume that the quantized coefficient is F͑0,0͒ = 12, and Q͑0,0͒ = 16 is the original quantizer that was used by JPEG. Let QЈ͑0,0͒ = 4 be the modified quantizer. According to Eqs. ͑3͒ and ͑4͒, the values M͑0,0͒ and N͑0,0͒ are computed using 
Galois Field
A Galois field ͑GF͒ is a finite field of p k elements with addition ͑ϩ͒ and multiplication ͑ϫ͒ operations that satisfy commutative, associative, and distributive laws where p is a prime number and k is a positive integer. In general, the arithmetic over GF͑p͒ is the same as modulo p, and thus Thien and Lin 4 use a Galois field with p k = p 1 = p = 251 elements. The proposed method employs a Galois field with 2 k elements, and the arithmetic over GF͑2 k ͒ is based on the representation of each element in GF͑2 k ͒. An element in GF͑2 k ͒ is generally represented using a polynomial-basis representation, as a binary polynomial of degree less than k. 
where is the exclusive-or ͑XOR͒ operator. For the subtraction, because each element in GF͑2 k ͒ is its own additive inverse, the subtraction of B from A is thus defined as
The multiplication and division involve a primitive polynomial H͑X͒, where H͑X͒ is a k-deg irreducible polynomial ͑i.e., it has no nontrivial factors͒. To multiply A by B, the remainder
where the operations of the binary coefficients in the polynomial multiplication and in the mod H͑X͒ operations are all modulo 2 such that all the resulting coefficients are still in ͕0, 1͖ and therefore binary. After the binary polynomial C͑X͒ = c k−1 X k−1 + ...+c 1 X + c 0 has been determined using Eq. ͑9͒, the multiplication of the two k-bits binary elements A and B is defined as
Last, to divide A by B, Eqs. ͑9͒ and ͑10͒ are used to multiply A by B −1 , where B −1 is the unique element E in GF͑2 k ͒ such that ͓B͑X͒E͑X͔͒mod H͑X͒ =1.
Proposed Method 3.1 Encoding
The quality factor QF ͕0,1... ,100͖ in JPEG is used to control image quality. To reconstruct an important image s with various quality levels based on the number of received JPEG stego codes, a low-quality factor QF L ͕0,1, ... ,5͖, a medium-quality factor QF M ͕10,11, ... ,25͖, and a high-quality factor QF H ͕55,56, ... ,85͖ can be used to generate, respectively, a low-quality JPEG code c 1 , a medium-quality JPEG code c 2 , and a high-quality JPEG code c 3 . The quality levels of the JPEG images r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 decompressed from codes c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 , respectively, are around 18 to 28 dB, 30 to 34 dB, and 36 to 40 dB. To reconstruct the image s error-freely, a difference image d is created by subtracting from the image s the high-quality JPEG image r 3 that is decompressed from the high-quality JPEG code c 3 . The difference image d is compressed using Huffman coding to generate the Huffman code c 4 . Last, based on the five user-defined integer parameters 1 Ͻ t 1 Ͻ t 2 Ͻ t 3 Ͻ t 4 ഛ n, the generated codes c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 4 are shared according to Eq. ͑11͒. As shown in Fig. 1 , the proposed ͓͑t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ͒ , n͔ threshold scheme comprises four phases: ͑1͒ codes generation, ͑2͒ sharing, ͑3͒ shares combining, and ͑4͒ data hiding. The encoding algorithm is given here:
Input: An important image s; five positive integer parameters t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , and n, where 1 Ͻ t 1 Ͻ t 2 Ͻ t 3 Ͻ t 4 ഛ n; and n cover images.
Output: The n JPEG stego codes
Step 1a: Compress the important image s using JPEG three times ͑with quality factors of QF L , QF M , and QF H , respectively͒, yielding a low-quality JPEG code c 1 of s, a medium-quality JPEG code c 2 of s, and a high-quality JPEG code c 3 of s.
Step 1b: Compute the difference image d by subtracting from the image s its high-quality JPEG image r 3 that is decompressed from the JPEG code c 3 . Compress the difference image d using Huffman coding to generate the Huffman code c 4 of the image d.
Step 2: For each code c i ͑i =1,2,3,4͒, use Eq. ͑11͒ to split the code c i into n shares.
Step 3: For each x =1,2, ... ,n, the x'th shadow is formed by binding together the x'th share of c 1 , the x'th share of c 2 , the x'th share of c 3 , and the x'th share of c 4 .
Step 4: Use the JPEG hiding method 27 to hide the n shadows in the n JPEG codes of the n cover images, respectively. ͑This generates n desired JPEG stego codes, and the cooperation of several stego codes can view the important image s at certain quality levels.͒ Note: In step 2, the code c i is divided into sectors of t i bytes each. Each byte is treated as a number between 0 and 255. Our share-generating polynomial is
where b 0 to b t i −1 are the t i numbers of the sector, and the computations in Eq. ͑11͒ are over GF͑256͒. Then, g͑1͒ to g͑n͒ are sequentially assigned to n shares. Since each sector of t i bytes contributes only a single byte ͓a value in the range 0 to 255 and determined by Eq. ͑11͔͒ to each generated share, the size of each share of the code c i is t i times smaller than that of the code c i . In step 3, the size of each shadow is ͚ i=1 4 ͉c i ͉ / t i , where ͉c i ͉ denotes the length of the code c i . In step 4, to avoid attracting the attention of attackers, the n shadows are hidden in n JPEG codes.
Decoding
When any t 1 of the n JPEG stego codes are received, the t 1 shadows can be extracted from the t 1 JPEG stego codes by inverse hiding. For each x =1,2, ... ,t 1 , the x'th shadow is partitioned to yield the x'th share of each code c i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ 4͒. The t 1 shares of the code c 1 are then used to reconstruct the low-quality JPEG code c 1 in inverse sharing, which can be done either by the matrix multiplication method ͑detailed in the following͒ or by the Lagrange interpolation method used in Thien and Lin 4 ͑The two methods are with similar computation loads.͒ The reconstructed JPEG code c 1 is decompressed to yield the low-quality JPEG image r 1 , which is an approximate version of the original important image s. When t 2 ͑or t 3 ͒ JPEG stego codes are available, the reconstruction process is similar to that described earlier, and the reconstructed image r 2 ͑or r 3 ͒ will be of medium ͑or high͒ quality.
Last, if at least t 4 JPEG stego codes are received, the t 4 shadows can also be extracted from the t 4 JPEG stego codes by inverse hiding. Then, for each x =1,2, ... ,t 4 , the The use of matrix multiplication to reconstruct the code c i from any t i out of the n shares ͑1 ഛ i ഛ 4͒ is described in the following. Recall that the sharing process uses Eq. ͑11͒ to generate the n pixel values g͑1͒ to g͑n͒. These n values can also be computed using
Accordingly, in the inverse-sharing process, when any t i of the n shares are obtained ͑and without loss of generality, suppose that the first t i shares are obtained͒, the first t i not-yet-used pixels g͑1͒, g͑2͒ ,. 
The arithmetic computations in Eq. ͑13͒ are still over GF͑256͒. Code c i is reconstructed by sequentially processing all pixels of the obtained t i shares. 
Example of Sharing and Inverse-Sharing Processes Based on GF(256)
An example of the sharing and inverse-sharing processes based on GF͑2 8 = 256͒ and H͑X͒ = X 8 + X 4 + X 3 + X + 1 is presented in the following. To partition t i = 2 numbers ͕100 and 200͖ of 8 bits each into n = 3 shares, Eq. ͑11͒ is used to compute: g͑1͒ = 100+ 200ϫ 1͓over GF͑256͔͒ = 172; g͑2͒ = 100+ 200ϫ 2͓over GF͑256͔͒ = 239; and g͑3͒ = 100+ 200 ϫ 3͓over GF͑256͔͒ = 39. In obtaining the two shares g͑1͒ = 172 and g͑3͒ = 39, the inverse matrix of ͓ 1 1 1 3 ͔ is computed over GF͑256͒ as
Experiments and Comparisons
Experimental Results
The inequalities ͑t 1 =3͒ Ͻ ͑t 2 =4͒ Ͻ ͑t 3 =5͒ Ͻ ͑t 4 =6͒ and the irreducible polynomial H͑X͒ = X 8 + X 4 + X 3 + X + 1 are used to generate n = 6 shadows of the important image. The JPEG source code that is used in the experiments is taken from the fourth public release of the Independent JPEG Group's free software. 28 The quality of an image is measured by the peak signal-to-noise ratio ͑PSNR͒.
In the first experiment, the 512ϫ 512 grayscale important image s Lena, displayed in Fig. 2 , is encoded by JPEG with three quality factors QF L =5, QF M = 25, and QF H = 85. The four codes c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 4 have lengths 5750, 13,787, 45,972, and 115,458 bytes, respectively. The six cover images Peppers, Jet, Boat, Lake, Baboon, and Zelda, shown in Fig. 3 , are all encoded using JPEG with QF= 75 to hide the six shadows and thus obtain the six JPEG stego codes. Figure 4 displays the n = 6 images that are decompressed from our six JPEG stego codes without any extraction of the hidden shadows, and the PSNRs of them are 37.42, 37.41, 36.40, 34.39, 32.73, and 38.67 dB, respectively. When different numbers of JPEG stego codes are received, the reconstructed versions r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 of Lena are as plotted in Fig. 5 , and the respective PSNRs are 27.32, 33.67, 39.35, and ϱ dB.
In the second experiment, the important image is the 512ϫ 512 grayscale image Tiffany. The six shadows are generated and then remain hidden in the six JPEG codes that are generated in the first experiment. The PSNRs of the decompressed images from these six JPEG stego codes are 37. 75 Last, Table 1 shows the bit rates ͓bits per pixel ͑bpp͔͒ of the JPEG-Q75 codes ͑created using JPEG with QF=75͒ before and after hiding our shadows. The bit rate will increase significantly after hiding a large-size secret. However, the bit rate of the JPEG stego code herein still falls in the reasonable range of JPEG, i.e., the bit rate of the stego code herein is smaller than that of the JPEG code generated using QF= 95, as shown in Table 1 . This alleviates the problem of code length. If the shadows of other imagesharing methods 4, 8, 9, [18] [19] [20] had been used, then the problem would have been worse. ͓The reason for using QF=95 as the upper bound to examine the bit rate of the JPEG stego codes is that, as stated in Kim et al.'s work, 29 the general quality factors ͑QFs͒ that are used in digital cameras are between 90 and 95.͔ Table 2 compares other sharing schemes 4, 8, 9, [17] [18] [19] [20] with ours in terms of shadow-size expansion, progressive ability, and lossless reconstruction ability. Each shadow in two of the related works 8, 18 is four times larger than the original important image, indicating that size expansions had occurred. In contrast, each shadow in all of the associated works 4, 9, 17, 19, 20 and ours is smaller than the original important image. Although Thien and Lin, 4 Tso, 9 and Hung et al. 17 all shared the image without size expansion, Thien and Lin 4 and Tso 9 could not reconstruct the image progressively, whereas Hung et al. 17 could not reconstruct the image in an error-free manner. Only Chen and Lin, 19 Wang and Shyu, 20 and ourselves have achieved reconstruction with all three desired characteristics. Among these three methods, as presented in Table 3 ͑50%͒. Hence, the transmission time in this work is less, and the survival rate in an unfriendly environment, in which the network connection time is unstable among the n channels used to store the n shadows, is increased. Equivalently, in this work, the storage space in a distributed storage system is most reduced. The smaller size of the shadows also facilitates the hiding of shadows in stego media. The construction of Table 3 , which compares the shadow sizes among nonexpanded schemes, is explained in the following. All data ͑except those obtained herein͒ are directly taken from the aforementioned works. 4, 9, 17, 19, 20 For fairness of comparison, the shadow sizes in Table 3 are all measured before hiding: all are shadow sizes, and none is a stego media size. This action eliminates the size-altering effects of particular post-processing ͑hiding͒ approaches. Assume that the given important image is the 512ϫ 512 grayscale image Lena, and the ͑largest͒ threshold value is set to 6 for all schemes, except that Hung et al. ' 17 is not lossless when all shadows are collected. In fact, if the original important image can be satisfactorily reconstructed with some loss, then our step 1b can be omitted, such that no Huffman code c 4 is generated. Then, each of our shadows can be reduced to ͚ i=1 3 ͉c i ͉ / t i = ͑5750/ 3͒ + ͑13,787/ 4͒ + ͑45,972/ 5͒ = 14,559 bytes ͑which is 5.55% of the size of the 512ϫ 512 grayscale important image Lena͒. Restated, the size of each shadow in this lossy version is about half of that in Hung et al.'s scheme. 17 Moreover, in this lossy version, the total shadow size herein is 14,559ϫ 6 = 87,354 bytes, which is still smaller than 30,723ϫ 5 = 153,615 obtained by Hung et al. 17 When the five shadows are collected, the 39.35-dB Lena ͓identical to that in Fig. 5͑c͔͒ is reconstructed, better than the 37.04-dB Lena revealed by Hung et al. 17 Notably, Tso 9 reconstructed Hung et al. Last, the size of each shadow in the proposed ͓͑t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ͒ , n͔ threshold scheme is ͚ i=1 4 ͉c i ͉ / t i . Therefore, it is suggested that the readers set the largest threshold t 4 to n, in order to save space. However, if the readers want to have more freedom, they may use their own choice of a threshold t 4 Ͻ n, at the price of wasting space for the shadows. When t 4 Ͻ n, a simulation is done in the following. Assume that n, the number of cover images, is at least 6. In general, the smallest threshold t 1 cannot be 1 because the purpose of sharing is that no participant alone can be trusted. Hence, ͕1 Ͻ t 1 =2Ͻ t 2 =3Ͻ t 3 =4Ͻ t 4 =5Ͻ n =6͖ is used to generate n = 6 shadows, the size of which is then compared to those in the image-sharing schemes 4, 9, 17, 19, 20 when the ͑largest͒ threshold value is set to 5 for all these works. The comparison results are given in Table 4 . It is observed that each shadow herein is still smaller than those Table 3 Comparison of shadow sizes in nonexpanded methods. 4, 9, 17, 19, 20 The ͑largest͒ threshold in all works is set to 6. But Hung et al. ' in the related works, 4, 9, 19, 20 and each shadow in our lossy approach is also smaller than that in Hung et al.'s lossy approach. 17 
Comparisons
Security Discussion
The code c i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ 4͒ cannot easily be revealed if fewer than t i shadows are intercepted. To determine the coefficients b 0 to b t i −1 in Eq. ͑11͒, t i equations are required. If only t i − 1 equations are available ͓and without loss of generality, suppose that g͑1͒, g͑2͒ ,..., and g͑t i −1͒ are intercepted͔, then the following t i − 1 equations can be constructed:
...
The preceding t i − 1 equations are solved for the t i unknown coefficients. The set of possible solutions has 256 members, so the probability of guessing the right solution is 1 / 256. Since ͉c i ͉ / t i polynomials exist for the code c i , the probability of obtaining the right code c i is ͑1 / 256͒ ͉c i ͉/t i . For example, for a low-quality JPEG code c i of size 5000 bytes, the number of sectors is 2500 if t i is 2. The probability of obtaining the correct JPEG code c 1 is only ͑1 / 256͒ 2500 =10 −6020
. If the security of the shadows is to be increased, a seed may be used in a random number generator to generate a random sequence for each shadow, and then XOR operations can be applied between the random sequence and the shadow. Each row of the XOR-encrypted shadows of the code c i can then be circularly shifted by a certain number of bytes. Similar operations are applied to each column. This will transform the shadows to their safer versions. In this process, each seed that is used to generate a random sequence is based on the creation time and shadow index. The seed can then be kept by all n participants or held by the company leader if the leader insists on attending the decoding meeting.
As stated in three works, [23] [24] [25] attackers may slightly change the plaintext and then observe the change in the ciphertext. This is so-called differential attack, which the related progressive image-sharing methods [18] [19] [20] cannot handle. The attackers may try to find a relationship between the plaintext and its ciphertext. Therefore, to ensure high security, the change in the ciphertext should cover a very large area if change occurs over a small area in the plaintext. To check this, the number of pixels change rate ͑NPCR͒ is used to measure the number of pixels that are changed in the ciphertext when only one pixel is changed in the plaintext. To define NPCR, let X and Y be two ciphertexts of size W ϫ H, where the plaintexts of X and Y differ by only one pixel. Let X͑i , j͒ and Y͑i , j͒ be the pixel values at position ͑i , j͒ in X and Y, respectively. Define
where D͑i , j͒ is defined as
ͮ .
͑15͒
The unified average changing intensity ͑UACI͒ is used to measure the average intensity of the differences between two ciphertexts X and Y. It is defined as
For random images, the expected values of NPCR and UACI are 99.609375% and 33.46354%, respectively, according to Kwok and Tang's work, 25 which is an image encryption method rather than an image-sharing method.
The NPCR values herein are between 99.54% and 99.60% ͑very close to 99.609375%͒, indicating that each XORenhanced shadow is very sensitive to a change in a single byte in the code c 1 ; the UACI values are between 33.36% and 33.45% ͑very close to 33.46354%͒, suggesting that the change of each XOR-enhanced shadow that is associated with a single-byte change in the code c 1 is very large. Similar observations are made when the code c 1 is replaced by the code c 2 , c 3 , or c 4 . Hence, the enhanced version can resist differential attack. Notably, to achieve this ability to resist differential attack, the design is based on simple XOR operations, unlike other designs. [23] [24] [25] Also, this XORenhanced version does not increase the shadow size.
Last, since the shadows are hidden using Chen et al.'s JPEG hiding method, 27 the security after hiding is discussed in the following. Possible attack due to visual inspection is avoided. As presented at the end of Sec. 4.2, in the ͕1 Ͻ t 1 =2Ͻ t 2 =3Ͻ t 3 =4Ͻ t 4 =5͖ and ͕1 Ͻ t 1 =3Ͻ t 2 =4Ͻ t 3 =5Ͻ t 4 =6͖ experiments, each shadow has size ͚ i=1 4 ͉c i ͉ / t i = ͑5750/ 2͒ + ͑13,787/ 3͒ + ͑45,972/ 4͒ + ͑115,458/ 5͒ = 42,056 bytes and ͚ i=1 4 ͉c i ͉ / t i = ͑5750/ 3͒ + ͑13,787/ 4͒ + ͑45,972/ 5͒ + ͑115,458/ 6͒ = 33,802 bytes, respectively. If other sets of ͕1 Ͻ t 1 Ͻ t 2 Ͻ t 3 Ͻ t 4 ͖ are used to generate n shadows, then each still has size smaller than 42,056 bytes. Hence, 42,056 bytes is the largest possible shadow size for all possible combinations of ͕1 Ͻ t 1 Ͻ t 2 Ͻ t 3 Ͻ t 4 ͖. Now, each shadow of size 42,056 bytes can be hidden in a JPEG-Q65 code of a cover image after a JPEG compression with QF= 65. Figure 6 shows the six images decompressed from the six created JPEG stego codes. ͑The hidden secret is left untouched when the JPEG decompression is performed.͒ Visual quality of these decompressed images is acceptable, reducing the probability that the codes get attacked when the attackers use visual inspection to find suspicious images.
Suspicious JPEG code length is avoided. Besides the evidence shown in Table 1, Table 5 lists the bit rates of the JPEG-Q65 codes before and after hiding the largest shadow of size 42,056 bytes. The bit-rates of the JPEG codes corresponding to QF= 95 are also listed to observe whether the bit rates of our JPEG stego codes are reasonable. From Table 5 , it is observed that even after hiding the largest shadow of size 42,056 bytes, the bit rate herein is still below that of the plain JPEG-Q95 code. Hence, the attackers will not be suspicious about the length of our stego codes.
The proposed method can pass the Chi-square 30 and StegSpy 31 analyses, which are tools to determine whether a secret is hidden in an image or a JPEG code. For the images Peppers or Jet, Figs. 7͑a͒-7͑d͒ display the results after Guillermito's Chi-square analysis tool is utilized to examine each pixel of the JPEG images mentioned there. The red curve indicates the probability that pairs of values follow a random distribution, and the green one represents the average value of all least significant bits ͑LSBs͒ in one block of pixels. The green curves in Figs. 7͑a͒-7͑d͒ suggest to the attackers that there is nothing strange in these JPEG images because all four green curves are around ͑0+1͒ / 2 = 0.5. Also, after a sort of latency, all red curves are flat at zero, indicating that the possibility of the existence of the hidden
Summary
This work proposes a ͓͑t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ͒ , n͔ threshold progressive image-sharing scheme. The contributions of this work are as follows.
• The proposed scheme has progressive ability. ͑Those in other works 4,9 do not have progressive ability,
Fig . 6 Same as Fig. 4 except that the to-be-hidden shadows are generated by the proposed ͓͑t 1 =2, Fig. 7 Results of Chi-square analysis: ͑a͒ is for the original JPEG cover image Peppers ͑no-hiding͒; ͑b͒ is for our JPEG stego image Peppers in Fig. 6͑a͒ ; ͑c͒ is for the original JPEG cover image Jet ͑no-hiding͒; and ͑d͒ is for our JPEG stego image Jet in Fig. 6͑b͒ . whereas the progressive methods, 17, 19, 20 which also use the sharing algorithm of Thien and Lin 4 to generate shadows, either have shadows that are larger than ours or cannot achieve lossless reconstruction.͒ Traditional image sharing schemes are suitable for sharing top-secret images because of their all-or-nothing property. Progressive schemes provide a flexible means of viewing sensitive images progressively at certain quality levels. As indicated in Table 3 , each of the shadows herein is smaller than those in the related works 4, 9, 19, 20 ͑and about half the size of that in Hung et al., 17 as determined by comparing their lossy approach with our lossy approach͒. This improvement reduces storage space and transmission time and facilitates the hiding of shadows. Therefore, the proposed method is better suited to transmit an image though limited communication channels.
• Easier to apply to scalable MPEG video transmission.
The proposed scheme can also be adopted in the transmission of scalable MPEG video. Scalable MPEG video transmission depends on the adapting of video compression bit streams with a range of quality levels to meet various network environments or different end-user requirements. Since an MPEG video encoder also uses quality factors to control the quality of decoded video, MPEG video codes of various quality levels can be generated with various quality factors, and then these MPEG codes can be shared. Hence, the proposed scheme conveniently provides a scalable video transmission system ͑and still with much smaller shadows than those of progressive schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] ; the reasoning for being much smaller is skipped in order to reduce paper length͒.
• Each of the shadows in the proposed scheme can resist differential attack, whereas the image-sharing methods 4, 9, 19, 20 in Table 3 cannot. Simple XOR and circular-shift operations are adopted to enhance the security of noiselike shadows, to enable them to resist differential attack.
• Unlike in several works, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, [18] [19] [20] the to-beshared data herein are the compression code rather than the raw file. The use of the compression code has at least the following two advantages: ͑1͒ since compression disturbs the correlation between adjacent pixels of an image, the permutation process that is employed elsewhere 4, 9, 19, 20 before the image is shared can be omitted; ͑2͒ after inverse-sharing reconstruction, the compression code requires less storage space than the raw file used in several works; 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, [18] [19] [20] yet the benefit of lossless reconstruction when most of the shadows are collected is retained.
• Arithmetic operations are performed over GF͑2 8 ͒ which can be replaced by GF͑2
k ͒ for any positive integer k, rather than GF͑p͒, which is used in the image sharing schemes 4, 5, 7, 12, 14, 17, 19 for a prime number p. This increases the convenience of sharing digital data, which are often in binary form, regardless of whether they are pixel values or bit streams.
